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Until recently most historians spoke very critically of the Industrial Revolution. They ______ that in the long run industrialization greatly raised the standard of living for the _______ man. But they insisted that its ______ results during the period from 1750 to 1850 were widespread poverty and misery for the _______of the English population. _______ contrast, they saw in the preceding hundred years from 1650-1750, when England was still a _______ agricultural country, a period of great abundance and prosperity. This view, _____ , is generally thought to be wrong. Specialists _______ history and economics, have ______ two things: that the period from 1650 to 1750 was _______ by great poverty, and that industrialization certainly did not worsen and may have actually improved the conditions for the majority of the populace (平民).
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浮点数的一般表示形式是N=2E×F，其中E是阶码，F是尾数。以下关于浮点表示的叙述中错误的是（3），两个浮点数进行相加运算，应首先（4）。 （4）处填（）。
阅读下列短文，回答下列问题。 加拿大某公司建造了一座示范厂，用酒精而不是用硫磺造纸浆。该公司董事长佩蒂说：“这是未来之路，用酒精制造纸浆意味着出现一种清洁、无污染的技术。” 如果在小规模工厂里取得成功的这项技术也能在正式规模的工厂里生产出较便宜的纸浆，它将对纸价产生影响。这项技术还能消除造纸工业常有的臭鸡蛋味——硫化氢的气味。 该公司使用的这种工艺叫ALCELL(即酒精alcohol和纤维素cellulose的合成词)，它使用酒精和水代替硫磺把木材分解成纸浆。这种工艺是加拿大在1972年发明的，以前从来没有实现商品化，但是这家公司希望它能使造纸工业发生彻底变革。 佩蒂说：“建造一座新的纸浆厂要耗资10亿美元，而且它要求木材供应源源不断。如有ALCELL工艺，只要耗资3.5亿美元就能建造一个工厂，并使工厂不停地运转，所需木材供应量较小。”他又说：“那意味着一个工厂一天生产350吨而不是1000吨纸浆。”林业产品分析家邓肯森说：“从环境方面来说，它比较清洁，而且小型厂这个概念将会使建造新纸浆厂变得较容易。”这种工艺取得成功，它将能以较低的成本生产纸浆。 对于ALCELL工艺，佩蒂和邓肯森发表了各自的看法。下列对他俩看法的叙述，符合原文意思的一项是( )。
我国烟叶复烤加工企业均为商业控股的烟叶复烤企业（烟叶委托加工企业）。
Question 41-44Saudi Arabia, OPEC’s cautious giant, understands all this. When Bill Clinton met Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Abdullah this week, Mr. Clinton argued for an output rise big enough to put an end to these painful prices. Prince Abdullah has promised to “make every effort to ensure equilibrium in the oil markets and to stabilise prices.” This week he revealed that Saudi Arabia has been quietly leaking an extra 600,000 barrels per day (bpd) on to the market since July in an effort to cool prices. .If that is true, it just goes to show that managing the oil markets is easier said than done. Despite several Saudi-inspired output increases by the cartel in recent months, the price has remained stubbornly high; this week, it soared to nearly $35 a barrel, the highest since theGulf war in 1990. As the cartel’s oil ministers gather in Vienna on September 10th to hammer out new production quotas, they are once again under intense pressure to release more oil, and fast. To hear OPEC members talk, you might think that serious price relief is on the way. There is discussion of “managing” prices down through a newish price mechanism. At the cartel’s meeting in March, ministers quietly agreed a grand new plan to keep oil within a target band of $22-28 a barrel. If the price of a basket of seven OPEC crudes stays below $22 for 20 trading days, the cartel is supposed to cut production by 500,000 barrels a 0ay. If it stays above $28 for 20 trading days, it will automatically raise production by the same amount. This price band has become the main topic of discussion in advance of the upcoming gathering of ministers. Prince Abdullah even talks of a return to a stable market within months. Oil traders and analysts note that the 20-day limit looks likely to be triggered again this week. A new report by Lehman Brothers, an investment bank, echoes the view of many: “Our expectation is that production will be increased by 500,000 bpd, either through the price mechanism or through a separate agreement.” When it released new figures suggesting that domestic oil-stock levels are lower than previously thought, the American government’s Energy Information Administration added that it too expects an increase of that size. Adding support to this theory are mumblings from OPEC delegates in support of the mechanism. Two decades ago, in the year of the cartel’s 20th birthday celeb rations, ministers gathered in Indonesia to hammer out details of a clever new scheme: a mechanism whereby the price of oil would be fixed, and adjusted every quarter automatically for such factors as inflation and currency fluctuations. Members had agreed on the ambitious plan, except for one crucial detail: at what price to start this price-peg crawling. The cautious Saudis, the self-proclaimed guardians of the oil market, wanted a price below $30 a barrel; the hawks in the cartel, unconcerned about consumers’ pain, demanded a much higher price. The ensuing bickering ensured that the scheme collapsed. History may now be repeating itself. When the current price-stabilization scheme was first unveiled, punters with short memories placed big bets that the cartel would adhere to it. By mid-June, the price basket had sailed past the 20-day upper trigger. But OPEC did not “automatically” release 500,000 barrels. Various confused and contradictory explanations surfaced from ministers, but not the oil. Only at their next officially scheduled meeting did they come up with a meager quota increase. What’s the author’s opinion about Saudi Arabia
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