From a merely ontological or metaphysical point of view it would be very difficult indeed to refute this thesis. But for a critical philosophy the problem assumes another face. Here we are under no obligation to prove the substantial unity of man. Man is no longer considered as a simple sub stance which exists in itself and is to be known by itself. His unity is conceived of as a functional unity. Such a unity does not presuppose a homogeneity of the various elements of which it consists. Not merely does it admit of, it even requires, a multiplicity and multiformity of its constituent parts, for this is dialectic unity, a coexistence of contraries.
"Men do not understand," said Heraclitus, "how that which is torn in different directions comes into accord with itself-harmony in contrariety, as in the case of the bow and the lyre." In order to demonstrate such a harmony we need not prove the identity or similarity of the different forces by which it is produced. The various forms of human culture are not held together by an identity in their nature, but by a conformity in their nature, by a conformity in their fundamental task. If there is an equipoise in human culture it can only be described as a dynamic, not as a static equilibrium; it is the result of a struggle between opposing forces. This struggle does not exclude that "hidden harmony" which, according to Heraclitus, "is better than that which is obvious".
We learn from the beginning of the text that a philosophy of culture ______.

A. is not at all to aggregate a mass of facts
B. seeks to understand the various facts as a whole
C. assumes the discrete facts as a systematic whole
D. claims history as a collection of the data of human culture