Case Study 1At a 1970 summit meeting between U.S. President Richard Nixon and the Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, they discussed a growing problem concerning trade in textiles between Japan and the United States, Nixon, for domestic political reasons, put heavy pressure upon Sato to curtail Japan’s proliferating textile exports to the United States. In response, Sato used a Japanese phrase which, loosely translated, means “I’ll do my damnedest.” All that Sato meant to convey was that, as they were on such good terms with each other, he would look into the problem and see if there was some way he could alleviate it without too many ugly repercussions. To Nixon, however, it sounded as though Sato had promised to remedy the situation.During the next few weeks both were shocked at the consequences in their meeting. Nixon was infuriated to learn that the new policies he expected were not forthcoming, and he bitterly concluded that he had been double-crossed. On the other hand, Sato was upset to find that he had unwittingly triggered a new wave of hostility toward his country.1) Why did Nixon think that he had been deceived by Sato?2) What can we learn from this case about the differences between the Japanese and Americans in the way they normally communicate?