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帮助员工协调其在组织内部和组织之间的活动的管理者扮演的是_______角色。
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Scramble, a public limited company, is a developer of online computer games.
(a) At 30 November 2011, 65% of Scramble’s total assets were mainly represented by internally developed intangible assets comprising the capitalised costs of the development and production of online computer games. These games generate all of Scramble’s revenue. The costs incurred in relation to maintaining the games at the same standard of performance are expensed to the statement of comprehensive income. The accounting policy note states that intangible assets are valued at historical cost. Scramble considers the games to have an indefinite useful life, which is reconsidered annually when the intangible assets are tested for impairment. Scramble determines value in use using the estimated future cash flows which include maintenance expenses, capital expenses incurred in developing different versions of the games and the expected increase in turnover resulting from the above mentioned cash outflows. Scramble does not conduct an analysis or investigation of differences between expected and actual cash flows. Tax effects were also taken into account. (7 marks)
(b) Scramble has two cash generating units (CGU) which hold 90% of the internally developed intangible assets. Scramble reported a consolidated net loss for the period and an impairment charge in respect of the two CGUs representing 63% of the consolidated profit before tax and 29% of the total costs in the period. The recoverable amount of the CGUs is defined, in this case, as value in use. Specific discount rates are not directly available from the market, and Scramble estimates the discount rates, using its weighted average cost of capital. In calculating the cost of debt as an input to the determination of the discount rate, Scramble used the risk-free rate adjusted by the company specific average credit spread of its outstanding debt, which had been raised two years previously. As Scramble did not have any need for additional financing and did not need to repay any of the existing loans before 2014, Scramble did not see any reason for using a different discount rate. Scramble did not disclose either the events and circumstances that led to the recognition of the impairment loss or the amount of the loss recognised in respect of each cash-generating unit. Scramble felt that the events and circumstances that led to the recognition of a loss in respect of the first CGU were common knowledge in the market and the events and the circumstances that led to the recognition loss of the second CGU were not needed to be disclosed. (7 marks)
(c) Scramble wished to diversify its operations and purchased a professional football club, Rashing. In Rashing’s financial statements for the year ended 30 November 2011, it was proposed to include significant intangible assets which related to acquired players’ registration rights comprising registration and agents’ fees. The agents’ fees were paid by the club to players’ agents either when a player is transferred to the club or when the contract of a player is extended. Scramble believes that the registration rights of the players are intangible assets but that the agents fees do not meet the criteria to be recognised as intangible assets as they are not directly attributable to the costs of players’ contracts. Additionally, Rashing has purchased the rights to 25% of the revenue from ticket sales generated by another football club, Santash, in a different league. Rashing does not sell these tickets nor has any discretion over the pricing of the tickets. Rashing wishes to show these rights as intangible assets in its financial statements. (9 marks)
Required:
Discuss the validity of the accounting treatments proposed by Scramble in its financial statements for the year ended 30 November 2011.
The mark allocation is shown against each of the three accounting treaments above. Professional marks will be awarded for clarity and expression of your discussion. (2 marks)
Section A – This ONE question is compulsory and MUST be attempted
Introduction
Rudos is a densely populated, industrialised country with an extensive railway network developed in the nineteenth century. This railway network (totalling 6,000 kilometres), together with the trains that ran on it, was nationalised in 1968 and so became wholly owned by the government. By 2004, RudosRail, the government-owned rail company, was one of the ten largest employers in the country. However, in that year, the general election was won by the Party for National Reconstruction (PNR) with a manifesto that promised the privatisation of many of the large publicly-owned organisations, including RudosRail. The PNR argued that there had been a lack of investment in the railway under public ownership and that the absence of competition had meant that ticket prices and costs (particularly labour costs) were too high for the taxpayer to continue subsidising it. The combination of high ticket prices and large public subsidies was very unpopular. As a result the government split the railway network into eight sections (or franchises) and invited private sector bids for each of these eight franchises. Each franchise was for ten years and was for the trains, tracks and infrastructure of each section. Each franchise would be awarded to the highest bidder.
The East Rudos franchise, one of the eight franchises, was awarded to Great Eastern Trains (GET), a company specifically set up to bid for the franchise by former members of RudosRail’s management. It was the only independent company to win a franchise. The other seven franchises were awarded to companies who were subsidiaries of global transport groups and, initially, were largely financed through investment from the parent companies. In contrast, GET was primarily financed through loans from the government-owned Bank of Rudos. The ten-year franchise started in 2006. GET is an unquoted company, owned by its management team.
GET – the early years
The first three years of the GET franchise were extremely successful, both in terms of profits and passenger satisfaction. This was partly due to government subsidies to help ease the transition of the network from public to private ownership. However, it was also due to the skill and knowledge of the management team. This team already had significant operating experience (gained with RudosRail) and they adapted quickly to the new private sector model. GET was the most profitable of the new franchises and it was held up as an example of successful privatisation. Its investment in new trains and excellent reliability record meant that it quickly built up a well-respected image and brand. GET uses a series of television advertisements to promote its services. These feature an old lady arriving at various stations and texting her family that she has ‘arrived safe & on time!’ In a recent consumer survey these advertisements were rated as both memorable and effective.
In the newly privatised rail system many passenger journeys crossed franchise boundaries, so that a journey often involved the use of two or more franchise operators. GET developed an innovative booking and payment system that also automatically reallocated revenue from fares between franchise holders. It also allowed Internet booking and gave discounts for early booking. This system was so successful that GET now uses the system to process the bookings of three of the other franchise operators. GET is paid on a transaction basis for the bookings that it processes on behalf of these other franchisees.
The fourth and fifth years of GET’s operation were not as successful. No government subsidies were paid in those years and economic problems in the country led to a fall in passenger numbers. Financial information for GET for 2010 is provided in Figure 1. Figure 2 provides data for the rail industry as a whole in Rudos.
Figure 1: Selected information for GET in 2010
Extract from the statement of financial position: All financial figures in $m
Extract from the statement of comprehensive income
All financial figures in $m
Figure 2: Financial information for the Rudos rail industry as a whole
Current position
Despite the apparent success of GET, there has been considerable criticism of the overall privatisation of the railway. Much of this criticism is concentrated in two of the geographical areas where the franchisees have struggled to provide an efficient and economic service. The government has appointed auditors who are reviewing the operation of these two franchises and a government minister has stated that ‘terminating the franchise and opening it up to re-bidding has not been ruled out as an option’. A major rail accident in Rudos (with many fatalities) has also led to concerns about safety and led to new legislation being enacted. Further safety legislation is expected concerning the relaying of track and all franchisees will be expected to implement the requirements immediately.
In 2009, the PNR was returned to power, but with a reduced majority. The leader of the main opposition party originally suggested that the railways might be re-nationalised if he were to gain power. However, he has since moderated his view, although he suggests that ‘they should return a significant percentage of their profits to the taxpayer’. Road transport has also suffered under the PNR government, with many of the roads in the country heavily congested. Fuel costs have increased to reflect increasing scarcity, causing many companies to face spiralling transport and storage costs. For the first time in the country’s history, an ecology (green) party has won seats in government, capitalising on the growth of the ‘green consumer’, particularly in urban areas.
International rail developments
The pioneering privatisation initiatives in Rudos have been observed by other countries and many have adopted similar policies. Recently, the Republic of Raziackstan announced that it intended to privatise its railway network. Raziackstan is approximately five hours’ flying time from Rudos and is part of the former eastern trading bloc. It is a country where there is currently very little health and safety legislation. Although there is also little employment legislation, public service jobs are traditionally viewed as safe, and employees perceive that a ‘railway job is a job for life’. At present the railway network, which is 1,500 kilometres long, employs 8,000 employees generating revenues of $180,000,000. The country itself still has a limited technological and financial infrastructure, with only an estimated 20% of the population having access to the Internet. However, all political parties are united in their desire to privatise the railways so that money can be invested elsewhere in the country, for example, for providing better health care.
Because of the poor condition of the railway, the proposal is to retain and upgrade the rail tracks under public ownership. However, the trains and infrastructure, such as stations, will be privatised. The government is looking for letters of intent from private companies who are willing to take over the complete network (excluding the tracks).
A stipulation of the contract is that the bidder should have a significant industrial presence in the country. For some time GET has been interested in acquiring the company that undertakes most of the track and train maintenance in Raziackstan. This company SOFR (SOciety Fabrication de Raziackstan) was established in 1919 and has a long tradition of engineering. GET has used the company to refurbish some of its equipment and they have been delighted with the results.
The board of GET now senses a great opportunity. It would like to combine the speedy acquisition of SOFR with a bid to run the rail network in Raziackstan. In fact, early informal indications from the Raziackstan government suggest that the bid will be successful if SOFR has been acquired by GET as no other prospective bidders for the network have yet come forward.
Required:
(a) Using appropriate models and frameworks, analyse GET’s current strategic position from both an internal and external perspective. (20 marks)
(b) GET’s proposed strategy is firstly to acquire SOFR and then the franchise to run the rail network of Raziackstan. You have been asked to provide an independent assessment of this proposed strategy.
Write a report evaluating GET’s proposed strategy. (16 marks)
Professional marks will be awarded in part (b) for appropriate structure, style. and fluency of the report. (4 marks)
(c) Critical Success Factors (CSFs) and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) are important business concepts in the context of franchising rail services.
Explain and discuss these concepts in the context of GET and the rail industry. (10 marks)
《民权法案》第7章禁止基于_______的歧视。
西班牙裔是指来自下列哪个国家的人？
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