Question 41-44Saudi Arabia, OPEC’s cautious giant, understands all this. When Bill Clinton met Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Abdullah this week, Mr. Clinton argued for an output rise big enough to put an end to these painful prices. Prince Abdullah has promised to “make every effort to ensure equilibrium in the oil markets and to stabilise prices.” This week he revealed that Saudi Arabia has been quietly leaking an extra 600,000 barrels per day (bpd) on to the market since July in an effort to cool prices. .If that is true, it just goes to show that managing the oil markets is easier said than done. Despite several Saudi-inspired output increases by the cartel in recent months, the price has remained stubbornly high; this week, it soared to nearly $35 a barrel, the highest since theGulf war in 1990. As the cartel’s oil ministers gather in Vienna on September 10th to hammer out new production quotas, they are once again under intense pressure to release more oil, and fast. To hear OPEC members talk, you might think that serious price relief is on the way. There is discussion of “managing” prices down through a newish price mechanism. At the cartel’s meeting in March, ministers quietly agreed a grand new plan to keep oil within a target band of $22-28 a barrel. If the price of a basket of seven OPEC crudes stays below $22 for 20 trading days, the cartel is supposed to cut production by 500,000 barrels a 0ay. If it stays above $28 for 20 trading days, it will automatically raise production by the same amount. This price band has become the main topic of discussion in advance of the upcoming gathering of ministers. Prince Abdullah even talks of a return to a stable market within months. Oil traders and analysts note that the 20-day limit looks likely to be triggered again this week. A new report by Lehman Brothers, an investment bank, echoes the view of many: “Our expectation is that production will be increased by 500,000 bpd, either through the price mechanism or through a separate agreement.” When it released new figures suggesting that domestic oil-stock levels are lower than previously thought, the American government’s Energy Information Administration added that it too expects an increase of that size. Adding support to this theory are mumblings from OPEC delegates in support of the mechanism. Two decades ago, in the year of the cartel’s 20th birthday celeb rations, ministers gathered in Indonesia to hammer out details of a clever new scheme: a mechanism whereby the price of oil would be fixed, and adjusted every quarter automatically for such factors as inflation and currency fluctuations. Members had agreed on the ambitious plan, except for one crucial detail: at what price to start this price-peg crawling. The cautious Saudis, the self-proclaimed guardians of the oil market, wanted a price below $30 a barrel; the hawks in the cartel, unconcerned about consumers’ pain, demanded a much higher price. The ensuing bickering ensured that the scheme collapsed. History may now be repeating itself. When the current price-stabilization scheme was first unveiled, punters with short memories placed big bets that the cartel would adhere to it. By mid-June, the price basket had sailed past the 20-day upper trigger. But OPEC did not “automatically” release 500,000 barrels. Various confused and contradictory explanations surfaced from ministers, but not the oil. Only at their next officially scheduled meeting did they come up with a meager quota increase. What can you infer from the passage

A. OPEC is, in the most cases, not reliable.
B. all the members of OPEC have the intention to lower oil prices when the prices get very high.
C. The oil prices are fully controlled by the market and OPEC can do nothing with them even though they wish to
D. In most cases OPEC has been very efficient in managing oil prices.