题目内容
I was 14 when Mr. Ingram knocked on our farmhouse door in Sacred Hear, Okla. The old farmer lived about a mile down the road and needed help cutting grass. It was the first time I was actually paid for work -- about 12 cents an hour, not bad when you consider it was 1939 ,a time when there was little business activity.
Mr. Ingram liked the job I did and ended up hiring me to dig potatoes. I even helped when a baby cow was being born.
One day he found an old truck that was stuck in the soft, sandy soil of the melon (瓜) field. It was full of melons that someone had tried to steal before their truck got stuck.
Mr. Ingram explained that the truck's owner would be returning soon, and he wanted me to watch and learn. It wasn't long before a man from a nearby village, who had a terrible reputation (名声) for fighting and stealing, showed up with his two full-grown sons. They looked very angry.
Calmly Mr. Ingram said, "Well, I see you want to buy some watermelons."
There was a long silence before the man answered," Yeah, I guess so. What are you getting for them？"
"Twenty-five cents each."
"Well, I guess that would be fair enough if you help me get my truck out of here."
It turned out to be our biggest sale of the summer, and an unpleasant, perhaps unfortunate, incident had been prevented. After they left, Mr. Ingram smiled and said to me," Son, if you don't for give (原谅) your enemies, you're going to run out of friends. "
Mr. Ingram died a few years later, but I have never forgotten him or what he taught me on my first job.
Which of the following best explains "ended up" as is used in the passage？
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In fact, the logic of catastrophe was pretty much the same in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and South Korea. (Japan is a very different story. ) In each case investors--mainly, but not entirely, foreign banks who had made short-term loans--all tried to pull their money out at the same time. The result was a combined banking and currency crisis, a banking crisis because no bank can convert all its assets into cash on short notice, a currency crisis because panicked investors were trying not only to convert long-term assets into cash, but to convert baht or rupiah into dollars. In the face of the stampede, governments had no good options. If they let their currencies plunge, inflation would soar and companies that had borrowed in dollars would go bankrupt; if they tried to support their currencies by pushing up interest rates, the same firms would probably go bust from the combination of debt burden and recession. In practice, countries split the difference--and paid a heavy price regardless.
Was the crisis a punishment for bad economic management？ Like most cliches, the catchphrase "crony capitalism" has prospered because it gets at something real: excessively cozy relationships between government and business really did lead to a lot of bad investments. The still primitive financial structure of Asian business also made the economies peculiarly vulnerable to a loss of confidence. But the punishment was surely disproportionate to the crime, and many investments that look foolish in retrospect seemed sensible at the time.
Given that there were no good policy options, was the policy response mainly on the right track？ There was frantic blame-shifting when everything in Asia seemed to be going wrong; now there is a race to claim credit when some things have started to go right. The International Monetary Fund points to Korea's recovery--and more generally to the fact that the sky didn't fall after all--as proof that its policy recommendations were right. Never mind that other IMF clients have done far worse, and that the economy of Malaysia---which refused IMF help, and horrified respectable opinion by imposing capital controls---also seems to be on the mend. Malaysia's Prime Minister, by contrast, claims full credit for any good news--even though neighbouring economies also seem to have bottomed out.
The truth is that an observer without any ax to grind would probably conclude that none of the policies adopted either on or in defiance of the IMF’s advice made much difference either way. Budget policies, interest rate policies, banking reform--whatever countries tried, just about all the capital that could flee, did. And when there was no more money to run, the natural recuperative powers of the economies finally began to prevail. At best, the money doctors who purported to offer cures provided a helpful bedside manner; at worst, they were like medieval physicians who prescribed bleeding as a remedy for all ills.
Will the patients stage a full recovery？ It depends on exactly what you mean by "full". South Korea's industrial production is already above its pre-crisis level; but in the spring of 1997 anyone who had predicted zero growth in Korean industry over the next two years would have been regarded as a reckless doomsayer. So if by recovery you mean not just a return to growth, but one that brings the region's performance back to something like what people used to regard as the Asian norm, they have a long way to go.
According to the passage, which of the following is NOT the writer's opinion？
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